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Source: Bruegel. Note: Gross written premiums (GWP) of top 25 insurers in Europe split into GWP written on domestic markets and GWP written 
on other European and rest of the world markets. See Figure 2 on page 4, and footnote 3.
THE ISSUE
The full entry into force at the start of 2016 of the European Union’s Solvency II risk-
based capital framework for insurance poses new challenges for supervisory coop-
eration in Europe. Supervisory challenges are present in terms of both management 
of systemic risk and day-to-day supervision. The common vulnerability of insurers 
to market risks, in particular the current low interest rate, is a source of systemic risk, 
and while supervisors might cooperate in day-to-day supervision, cooperation, such 
as exchange of information and coordinated action, can run less smoothly in times of 
crisis. Furthermore, risks are present in the context of a European insurance sector that 
is highly integrated, with a large and rising share of cross-border business.
THE POLICY CHALLENGE
The European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisory Authority (EIOPA) 
currently plays a coordinating role in supervision, with final authority remaining with 
the national supervisors. A more centralised role for EIOPA in a European insurance 
union would overcome the fragmentation in supervision and ensure a joined-up view 
of the large cross-border insurance groups, enhancing the effectiveness of supervision. 
However, a staggered approach can be followed in a move towards insurance union. In 
the first stage, EIOPA can be given the authority to foster supervisory convergence. Ulti-
mately, EIOPA would be given direct powers to supervise significant insurance groups, 
within a network of national insurance supervisors.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The full entry into force at the start of 
2016 of the European Union’s Solvency 
II risk-based capital framework1 for 
insurance poses new challenges for 
supervisory cooperation in Europe. 
National supervisors must cooperate 
in the approval and monitoring of 
international models used by large 
cross-border insurance groups. The 
European Insurance and Occupational 
Pension Authority (EIOPA) plays an 
important coordination role, but cannot 
settle disagreements between national 
supervisors.
Supervisory challenges are present in 
terms of both management of systemic 
risk and day-to-day supervision. The 
common vulnerability of insurers to 
market risks, in particular the current 
low interest rate, is a source of systemic 
risk, and while supervisors might 
cooperate in day-to-day supervision, 
cooperation, such as exchange of 
information and coordinated action, 
can run less smoothly in times of crisis. 
Risks are present in the context of a 
European insurance sector that is highly 
integrated, with a large and rising share 
of cross-border business. On average, 
EU insurance groups conduct 60 percent 
of their business outside their home 
country, rising to about 70 percent for 
large insurers. Europe is home to more 
globally systemic insurers2 than the 
Americas or Asia, and European insurers 
are larger than their American or Asian 
counterparts measured by gross written 
premiums. 
As the large insurers have become 
pan-European players, the supervisory 
balance is tilting from coordination 
towards centralisation in a possible 
insurance union. This raises a number 
of questions. What are the arguments for 
and against centralisation of insurance 
supervision? What would be the scope of 
a possible insurance union? What would 
the legal basis be? How rapid should 
the move to insurance union be? In this 
Policy Brief we set out to answer these 
questions.
2. THE EUROPEAN INSURANCE 
LANDSCAPE
The single market enables insurance 
companies to establish branches in other 
European Union countries based on 
home-country control. Host countries 
have only to be notified about the 
establishment of cross-border branches. 
The proportion of non-domestically 
owned insurers in EU countries increased 
from 44 percent in 2007 to 54 percent 
to 2012 (Figure 1). The global financial 
crisis of 2008-09 and the European 
sovereign crisis in 2010-11 did not 
lead to a reduction in cross-border 
insurance, in contrast to banking (Hüttl 
and Schoenmaker, 2016). Branches 
and subsidiaries in EU countries are set 
up mainly by insurers from other EU 
countries (80 percent) with a minor part 
from third countries (20 percent).
Figure 1: Cross-border penetration in 
European insurance, 2007-12
Source: Bruegel based on Schoenmaker and Sass (2016). Note: 
Number of foreign subsidiaries and branches as share of total 
number of insurance companies and foreign branches in the 
European Union. The share is calculated for the aggregated EU 
insurance system.
We can gauge the depth of the 
European single insurance market by 
splitting the gross written premium 
(GWP) of the largest insurers into the 
assets held in the home country, the rest 
of Europe and third countries3. Table 1 
lists the top 30 insurers in Europe4 and 
shows that 41 percent of GWP is earned 
in the home country, 31 percent in the 
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1.  The Solvency II Directive 
(2009/138/EC). See: http://
ec.europa.eu/finance/
insurance/solvency/
solvency2/index_en.htm.
2.  As defined by the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB) in 
consultation with the 
International Association 
of Insurance Supervisors 
(IAIS). See FSB, 2015. The 
G-SII (global systemically 
important insurers) list is 
updated annually. The FSB 
and IAIS are also working 
on the designation of global 
systemically important re-
insurers.
3.  Gross written premium: 
total premium written 
by an insurer minus 
reinsurance premiums and 
commissions. For the full 
methodology for measuring 
geographic segmentation, see 
Schoenmaker and Sass (2016).
4.  We include the Swiss 
insurers, which have the right 
of establishment in the EU 
under the Bilateral Insurance 
Agreement of 1989 between 
the EU and Switzerland. EU 
insurers have a reciprocal 
right of establishment in 
Switzerland.
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rest of Europe and 28 percent in the rest of 
the world. The three largest insurers, AXA, 
Allianz and Generali, are truly European 
players with only about 30 percent of 
business at home and about 50 percent in 
the rest of Europe. 
Table 1: Top 30 insurance groups in Europe by gross written premium (GWP), end-2015
Insurance groups Country
GWP
(€ millions)
Total assets 
 (€ millions)
Home
Rest of 
Europe
Rest of 
world
AXA FR € 91,938 € 887,070 26% 40% 34%
Allianz DE € 76,723 € 848,942 25% 52% 23%
Generali IT € 70,323 € 500,549 34% 60% 6%
Prudential UK € 49,715 € 525,125 24% 0% 76%
Zurich Insurance 
Group
CH € 43,717 € 351,682 9% 33% 58%
Lloyds UK € 36,192 € 113,482 18% 14% 68%
Talanx-HDI DE € 31,799 € 152,760 29% 31% 40%
CNP Assurances FR € 31,760 € 393,732 78% 12% 10%
Credit Agricole 
Assurances
FR € 31,200 € 342,214 81% 16% 3%
Aviva UK € 30,202 € 526,331 45% 37% 18%
BNP Cardif FR € 28,000 € 167,316 41% 36% 23%
MAPFRE ES € 22,312 € 63,489 34% 61% 5%
Chubb ACE CH € 21,467 € 94,193 3% 11% 86%
AEGON NL € 20,311 € 415,729 17% 30% 53%
Achmea NL € 19,922 € 92,917 94% 6% 0%
Poste Vita IT € 18,238 € 105,712 100% 0% 0%
ERGO DE € 16,535 € 128,777 73% 27% 0%
Unipol Gruppo 
Finanziario
IT € 15,565 € 89,773 100% 0% 0%
R+V Versicherung DE € 14,536 € 91,254 30% 50% 20%
Groupama FR € 13,465 € 107,295 73% 27% 0%
SCOR FR € 13,421 € 41,605 15% 26% 59%
Swiss Life CH € 13,040 € 174,018 56% 38% 6%
Societe Generale 
Insurance
FR € 11,910 € 111,312 82% 18% 0%
Cooperatie VGZ NL € 10,755 € 7,674 100% 0% 0%
XL Group UK € 9,898 € 54,029 20% 26% 54%
RSA UK € 9,447 € 27,968 44% 26% 30%
Ageas BE € 9,359 € 104,486 55% 41% 4%
NN Group NL € 9,205 € 162,152 76% 13% 11%
Vienna Insurance 
Group
AT € 9,020 € 41,939 45% 55% 0%
Legal & General UK € 8,707 € 540,635 78% 10% 12%
Top 30 insurers in 
Europe
€ 788,681 € 7,264,160 41% 31% 28%
Source: Bruegel based on annual reports.
Table 2: Geographical segmentation of top 30 banks and insurers in Europe, 2015
Home Rest of region Rest of world
Top 30 banks 54% 23% 23%
Top 30 insurers 41% 31% 28%
Source: Banks from Schoenmaker (2016) and insurers from Table 1.
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5.  A full assessment can be 
found in Schoenmaker and 
Sass (2016).
6.  The domino effect is present 
in re-insurance, as primary 
insurers are connected with 
re-insurers. 
7.  Insurers are exposed 
to banks through several 
linkages at the asset side: 
cash holdings at banks, loans 
to banks and bank securities 
(both debt and equity). In the 
Netherlands, for example, 
the aggregate exposure of the 
insurance sector to banks 
amounts to only 7 percent of 
total insurance assets (Dutch 
Central Bureau for Statistics). 
Moreover, the concentration 
risk rules stimulate insurers 
to keep the exposure to 
individual banks within 3 
percent.
Figure 2: Geographical segmentation of GWP of top 25 insurers in Europe, 2000-15
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Source: Updated from Schoenmaker and Sass (2016). Note: Calculations are made on a weighted average basis.
Figure 2 summarises the GWP 
data, showing that the home share has 
reduced from 46 percent in 2000 to only 
40 percent in 2015, while the regional 
share from the rest of Europe has slightly 
increased from 30 percent to 31 percent 
over the same period. Finally, the rest of 
the world share has increased over the 
last few years and is catching up with the 
regional share.
It is interesting to examine geographic 
segmentation of insurance premiums 
compared to the internationalisation 
of the banking system, measured by 
assets. It appears that insurers are more 
international than banks (Table 2). 
While banks conduct 54 percent of their 
business at home and 23 percent in the 
rest of Europe and the rest of the world, 
insurers only write 41 percent of their 
business at home.
In terms of foreign-written premium in 
EU countries as a percentage of the total 
GWP of each country’s insurance sector, 
whether domestically or foreign-owned, 
the extent of inward claims coming from 
the EU is fairly high at 29 percent of total 
country GWP. From non-EU countries, 
the share is only 7 percent. Some central 
and eastern European countries, such as 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary and 
Slovakia, have limited domestic insurance 
sectors and are very internationally 
oriented with more than 80 percent of 
GWP written by foreign entities. As in 
banking, these countries are served by 
insurers from western Europe (Hüttl and 
Schoenmaker, 2016).
Ireland is an international insurance 
centre, with domestic business 
amounting to only 4 percent of GWP. 
The majority of insurers in Ireland 
are subsidiaries of large international 
insurance parents; some of which 
are part of financial conglomerates 
domiciled in the EU (IMF, 2015). In other 
EU countries, the domestic share of GWP 
ranges from 16 percent (Luxembourg) to 
88 percent (Slovenia) with an average of 
64 percent5.
Again, we can compare foreign 
penetration in the banking and insurance 
markets. Schoenmaker and Sass (2016) 
find that the component of business 
from other EU countries is far higher in 
insurance (29 percent) than in banking 
(17 percent). The single market in 
insurance is thus more intensified than in 
banking. 
3. RISKS IN INSURANCE
3.1 SYSTEMIC RISKS
Contagion risks arise from the intercon-
nectedness of the financial system (De 
Bandt and Hartmann, 2002). But the 
domino effect from the failure of one 
institution leading to the failure of others 
is less strong in the insurance sector 
compared to banks, because insurance 
companies are far less connected6,7. 
A key source of systemic risk for 
insurance is common exposure to market 
risks (see also IMF, 2016). When the 
maturity of assets and liabilities is not 
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8.  Different from the 
earlier stress tests, only solo 
insurance companies are 
subjected to the stress test to 
gauge the effects at the country 
level. While the impact of 
low interest rates might 
vary in different countries 
(eg the share of guaranteed 
life products is country 
dependent), insurance groups 
aggregate internally their risks 
and manage these at solo and 
group level (Schoenmaker and 
Sass, 2016).
9.  See Articles 138(4) and 
218(3) of the Solvency II 
Directive (2009/138/EC) 
http://eur-lex.europa.
eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX:32009L0138.
fully matched, insurance companies 
are subject to interest rate risk. The low 
interest rate environment at the time of 
writing brings into question the viability 
of insurance companies, in particular 
life insurers, which have long-term 
liabilities. Furthermore, Solvency II 
forces insurers to value their assets at 
market value, which makes the insurance 
sector pro-cyclical. When equity or 
commodities prices rise, for example, 
insurers’ equity capital goes up and vice 
versa. In addition, insurers might switch 
between investment categories at the 
same time, for example in the search for 
yield in the low interest rate environment. 
By contrast, insurers might collectively 
sell their riskier assets in a flight to safety 
during crises. A potential fire sale of 
assets would lead to a downward spiral in 
asset prices.
Supervisors could stress test the 
resilience of insurers against potential 
adverse market developments and 
could extract conclusions to support the 
stability of the financial system. Stress 
tests are scenario-based and forward 
looking, which is useful because most 
supervisory tools are static (how much 
capital does an insurer need against 
today’s risks) or even backward-looking 
(regulatory reporting on positions in the 
last quarter or year).
EIOPA’s 2016 stress test is its third 
following stress tests in 2011 and 2014. 
The 2016 stress test is based on a ‘double 
hit’ scenario, in which, in addition to 
low interest rates, assets prices are also 
stressed (EIOPA, 2016a and 2016b). 
The national insurance supervisors 
execute the centrally agreed stress test 
for solo insurance companies (national 
subsidiaries), after which the results are 
aggregated by EIOPA8. We recommend 
that the stress test should also be applied 
at group level, because insurance groups 
should not be regarded as a string of 
independent subsidiaries.
Sensitivity to market risk can also be 
reduced by making the application of 
regulation less pro-cyclical. In the new 
risk-sensitive capital framework, capital 
charges are automatically lower in good 
times, when perceived risk is lower, and 
higher in bad times. Micro-application of 
the capital rules would thus increase pro-
cyclicality. The Solvency II framework has 
a two tier capital requirement to provide 
supervisors with a “supervisory ladder of 
intervention”. Supervisors treat the breach 
of the higher capital threshold, the 
regular Solvency Capital Requirement 
(SCR), as an indication that the 
financial soundness of the undertaking 
is deteriorating. In such a case, the 
insurance company must submit a 
recovery plan to return to its regular 
SCR within six months. Breaches of the 
lower threshold, the Minimum Capital 
Requirement (MCR) trigger very strict 
recovery planning. If that is not complied 
with, the company will be closed down. 
We recommend applying the room 
between the SCR and the MCR in a 
macro-prudential way (De Vries et 
al, 2015). In an economic upturn, the 
supervisor should require an insurer 
to return to its SCR within a very short 
period. By contrast, in an economic 
downturn, the supervisor should give 
the insurer more time. Solvency II allows 
for an extension of up to seven years in 
exceptional adverse situations that effect 
insurance companies with a significant 
market share9.
Finally, the insurance sector has a 
common exposure to non-financial 
shocks that play out in the long term, 
such as changes in life expectancy 
and climate change. On the latter, the 
insurance sector is exposed to the 
physical risk of more natural disasters, 
and also to the transition from a high-
carbon to a low-carbon economy. Such 
a transition is driven by stricter climate 
policies, which could be brought in 
suddenly, impacting asset prices: carbon-
intensive assets would drop in value, 
while low-carbon and carbon-neutral 
assets might rise in value (Schoenmaker 
and Van Tilburg, 2016). The European 
Systemic Risk Board suggests 
complementing regular stress tests with 
specific carbon stress tests, incorporating 
carbon transition scenarios (ASC, 2016), 
including late and sudden transition 
scenarios. When the stress test results 
flag up vulnerabilities, insurers and 
supervisors should take remedial action.
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3.2 MICRO-LEVEL RISKS10
At the micro level, supervisors are con-
cerned with risks faced by individual 
insurers. However, only 64 percent of 
business in EU countries is under the 
direct control of the home supervisor 
and 29 percent under the control of host 
supervisors (see section 2). For the three 
biggest insurers, the share controlled 
by EU host supervisors is even larger 
at about 50 percent of GWP. The large 
cross-border shares suggest that there 
could be risks that might not appear on 
home supervisors’ radars insofar as they 
originate abroad.
Most cross-border insurance is carried 
out through subsidiaries, which are 
separate legal entities that carry both 
the assets and the liabilities on the same 
balance sheet11, meaning the assets are 
available for settling insurance claims in 
countries where an insurer does business. 
Nevertheless, for efficiency reasons, large 
insurance groups perform integrated 
asset and risk management at group level 
(Schoenmaker and Sass, 2016). When a 
local subsidiary needs asset management 
expertise, there is often an internal 
consultancy requirement to ‘buy’ that 
expertise from headquarters, where asset 
and liability management policies are 
developed and executed.
This could raise issues around the 
approval of internal models under 
Solvency II. While the host-country 
supervisor has control over the assets 
and operations of foreign subsidiaries 
in its jurisdiction, the design and rollout 
of an insurance group’s internal model 
are typically done at the head office, 
and the host-country supervisor might 
need to rely, at least partly, on the home 
supervisor.
Another challenge in international 
regulation and supervision is the level 
playing field. Even with a harmonised 
regulatory regime, supervisors might 
interpret or apply ‘common’ rules 
differently (for example, the application 
of capital add-ons in Pillar 2 of Solvency 
II). Finally, supervisors have become 
more risk averse since the global 
financial crisis. They tend to require extra 
capital beyond the regulatory minimum 
at subsidiaries, whether foreign or 
domestic. This might not be freely 
available within the insurance group. 
Insurance groups can thus be confronted 
with different pockets of ring-fenced 
excess capital, which they cannot use for 
the group as a whole12.
These supervisory challenges 
clearly indicate a need for home and 
host supervisors to cooperate, but this 
cooperation might be hampered when 
interests diverge, in particular during 
crises13. As supervisors are accountable 
to their finance ministries and/or 
parliaments, their primary focus is 
serving the national interest, including 
that of national policyholders. They 
thus put the health of the separate 
subsidiaries in their own jurisdictions 
above the health of insurance groups 
as a whole. But insurance groups run 
their businesses on an integrated basis. 
As there can be group contagion (see 
section 2), there is a strong case for 
group supervision and a group capital 
requirement, complementing national 
supervision and capital requirements14.
Currently, EIOPA coordinates the 
supervision of international insurance 
groups. EIOPA takes the lead in setting 
secondary rules and harmonising EU 
supervisory practices, in particular 
with regard to Solvency II. EIOPA also 
participates in the so-called supervisory 
colleges of the relevant home and host 
supervisors of cross-border insurance 
groups, in order to contribute to their 
efficient functioning and to foster 
coherent application of EU law.
In the case of, for example, 
disagreement on the group internal 
model in the supervisory college, EIOPA 
can give advice15, but final authority rests 
with national supervisors. Similar, EIOPA 
can give guidance on the application 
of Solvency II Pillar 2 capital add-ons, 
but national supervisors ultimately set 
these add-ons. As we have noted, some 
host supervisors tend to set higher local 
capital requirements. 
To address these supervisory 
challenges, we recommend that EIOPA 
should be given a stronger role in 
the supervision of large cross-border 
European insurance groups.
10.  This sub-section draws on 
Schoenmaker and Sass (2016). 
11.  Freshfields Bruckhaus 
Deringer (2003), examined 
to what extent separation of 
legal personalities and limited 
liability of subsidiaries can 
help reduce contagion risk 
within a financial group. They 
find that such legal firewalls 
can help protect against direct 
contagion (credit exposures 
arising from intragroup 
transactions or operational 
risk from sharing of services) 
but are less effective against 
indirect contagion (reputation 
risk and funding risk). This is 
because indirect contagion 
arises from perceptions and 
behaviour of (potential) 
counterparties and other 
market participants. The 
strategy of most major banks 
and insurers of developing and 
maintaining a global brand 
reinforces contagion risk.
12.  Cerutti and Schmieder 
(2014) provide examples of 
how ring-fencing can lead to 
extra capital needs in financial 
institutions.
13.  See Herring (2007) and 
the Annex in Hüttl and 
Schoenmaker (2016) for an 
application of game theory to 
supervisory cooperation.
14.  Title 3 of the Solvency II 
Directive (2009/138/EC) sets 
the requirements for group 
supervision and group capital 
requirements.
15.  See Article 231 of 
the Solvency II Directive 
(2009/138/EC).
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4. THE NEED FOR SUPERVISORY 
COOPERATION
Cooperation between national insurance 
supervisors can be done through coor-
dination, as currently, or in a centralised 
way with the central European supervisor 
being responsible for the consolidated 
supervision of insurers in Europe. In a 
centralised system, the European super-
visor and national supervisors would 
work together in a network on the day-to-
day supervision of insurers.
4.1 ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST   
CENTRALISATION
The ultimate aim is to supervise the 
macro and micro risks in insurance in the 
most effective way. Currently, insurance 
supervision is in coordination mode, with 
EIOPA as coordinator, while banking su-
pervision moved to the centralised mode 
in 2014, with the European Central Bank 
(ECB) as centralised supervisor.
The argument for centralisation of 
insurance supervision is strongest on 
the micro-prudential front. Cross-border 
insurance within the EU is significant at 
29 percent. A centralised model would 
strengthen consolidated supervision of 
cross-border insurance groups, including 
by providing an integrated overview of 
the asset and risk management functions. 
For insurance, the consolidation 
argument is stronger than for banking, 
for which cross-border banking amounts 
to 17 percent.
The early experience of the 
banking union shows that centralised 
supervision can increase its effectiveness 
(Schoenmaker and Véron, 2016). 
Supervision of euro-area cross-border 
banking groups is conducted in a 
joined-up manner in contrasts to the 
previous fragmented, country-by-country 
practice with supervisory colleges. 
The key mechanism is the operation 
of joint supervisory teams, which for 
each supervised banking group enable 
information sharing between the ECB 
and relevant national supervisors while 
providing a clear line of command and 
decision-making. The ECB heads the 
joint supervisory teams, with national 
supervisors participating. Furthermore, 
the ECB sets the Pillar 2 capital add-ons 
for the significant euro-area banks based 
on a common methodology.
But there is also an argument against 
centralisation. Insurance, in particular 
for retail clients and smaller companies, 
is local business, with products attuned 
to national tax and social security 
laws. More broadly, the national legal 
setting (eg liability law) is important for 
insurance products.
Nevertheless, the rising share of 
cross-border insurance tilts the balance 
from coordination to centralisation. We 
recommend that EIOPA should be given 
a strong role as centralised supervisor 
to ensure joined-up supervision of large 
cross-border insurance groups in a 
possible insurance union.
4.2 MOVING TOWARDS INSURANCE UNION
What scope would a possible insurance 
union have? The main argument for in-
surance union is that it would lead to the 
more effective supervision of cross-bor-
der insurance groups, which is an inter-
nal market argument. The appropriate 
scope would thus be the entire EU. By 
contrast, the main rationale for bank-
ing union was to break the doom loop 
between banks and sovereigns, which 
posed a problem for the euro area. The 
scope of ECB banking supervision within 
the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM 
Regulation; EU/1024/2013) is thus the 
euro area, but the possibility is retained 
for non-banking union EU countries to 
opt in because of the internal market in 
banking. It should be noted that the cur-
rent banking union is more wide-ranging 
than the sole transfer of direct supervi-
sory powers over significant insurance 
groups to EIOPA in a possible insurance 
union.
Another question is the legal basis. A 
regulation conferring supervisory powers 
over significant insurance groups on 
EIOPA can be based on Article 114 TFEU, 
which refers to the proper functioning 
of the internal market. That would 
be in line with the legal basis for the 
powers of the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA) to supervise 
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credit ratings agencies (Regulation 
EU/513/2011) and trade repositories 
(Regulation EU/648/2012)16.
The move to banking union was 
relatively swift, from decision in 2012 
to implementation in 2014. Banks are 
more sensitive to changes in confidence 
than insurers, and are subject to runs. 
A staggered approach can therefore be 
followed in a move towards insurance 
union. In the first stage, EIOPA can be 
given the authority to foster supervisory 
convergence. These powers would enable 
EIOPA to conduct independent reviews 
of the supervisory oversight of national 
markets. EIOPA could also be given the 
power to approve and monitor insurance 
groups’ internal models. In the second 
and final stage, EIOPA would be given 
direct powers to supervise significant 
insurance groups. EIOPA would execute 
these powers jointly with national 
insurance supervisors in a single network 
of insurance supervision.
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16.  Article 8(1) of the 
Regulations establishing 
the European Supervisory 
Authorities (EU/2093/2010; 
EU/2094/2010; EU/2095/2010) 
allows these agencies “to fulfill 
any other specific tasks set out 
in this Regulation or in other 
legislative acts”.
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